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Abstract 
Governance refers to the ability to organize a particular society in an orderly manner so as to maintain peace, 
progress, and development. It is mainly associated with ensuring the welfare of the citizenry in an atmosphere of 
democracy. Thus, when one talks about governance, it is usually associated with law and order. The degree of 
the success achieved in maintaining law and order in a particular society brings out the vivid distinction between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance. Thus, religious or cultural bias can make a whole lot of difference between good 
and bad governance. This paper concentrates on the influence of religious bias on the political arena of Nigeria – 
on its ability to govern itself. A brief survey of some of the incidents involving religion and politics from 1979 
till date would clearly show that Nigeria is still very far from declaring herself a country free from various kinds 
of militating obstacles against good governance - the Sharia and currently the menace of Boko Haram, which has 
registered Nigeria in the notorious book of global terrorism. 
 
1. The Problem of the Sharia in the Second Republic 
 
Islamic law had always been in existence in Nigeria, even during the colonial period when the name Nigeria had 
not been clearly given to the amalgamated nationalities within it. At this time, Sharia was practised alongside 
with the system of British indirect rule through emirs and chiefs, whereby the British instituted regional and 
provincial governments parallel and superior to that of the native authority. With independence, the programme 
of the Islamisation of Nigeria was vigorously pursued by some muslim conservatives. The Jamaatu Nasril Islam 
(JNI) and the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, for instance, constituted essential vehicles for the realisation 
of this project. Ahmadu Bello - Premier of Northern Nigeria, was in the forefront for the implementation of the 
Islamisation of Nigeria, especially through the instrumentality of the Sufi brotherhoods, the reformists and state 
Islam. It cannot be completely ruled out from the crisis and eventual civil war that rocked the very unity of 
Nigeria (1966- 1970). 
According to Mazrui (1986:15-16), for instance, in the Second Republic (1979-1983), the National Party of 
Nigeria (N.P.N) or  the Political Party in power under President Shehu Shagari used the tools of political 
expediency to foster the Sharia agenda. The President established a Presidential Advisory Board on Islamic 
Affairs. Open appeals were made to Muslims in such places as Sokoto, Oyo, and Kaduna etc to vote for the 
N.P.N. The government spent flagrantly on Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca. It was at the time of Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari that the popular Austerity Measures were first introduced to Nigeria, while at the same time giving out 
millions of Tax-payers’ money for the sponsorship of Islamic programmes, like the Hajj operation.  In 1981 
alone, about 100,000 pilgrims were sponsore by the state to travel to Mecca. Note that the period between 1979 
and 1983 was memorable in different ways. For instance, the two tendencies of privatisation and militarisation 
appeared to be prominent. Under civilian rule from 1979 privatisation gathered momentum. The resources of the 
nation were, to all intents and purposes, deemed to be private hunting ground for those in power and of their 
supporters. Lucrative contracts for trade or construction were handed out on the basis of personal considerations. 
Foreign exchange was privately allocated and arbitrarily distributed. Millions of dollars and naira disappeared 
into the private accounts of key figures abroad. Moreover, the rampant unofficial and unlegislated privatisation 
of the state’s resources seemed to have set the stage for the state’s militarisation. Nigeria’s armed forces – restive 
for a variety of reasons- found additional grounds for impatience with the civilian politicians. In the end, it was 
the putsch of 31 December 1983, and the push towards militarisation, which triumphed over the pull towards 
privatisation of the Nigerian state. 
 
2. Ethnicity and Corruption in the Second Republic 
 
In the 1979 elections for the Second Republic, the notion of ethnic bases was used to refer to the states whose 
original ethnic states corresponded to those of the Presidential candidates. For example, Igbo (Anambra, Imo) for 
Nnamdi Azikiwe who was the Presidential candidate of the NPP; Kanuri (Borno) for the Great Nigeria People’s 
Party (GNPP) Presidential candidate, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim; Hausa (People’s Redemption Party, PRP) with 
Aminu Kano as Presidential candidate; Yoruba (Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo) for Obafemi Awolowo who was the 
Presidential candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN); and Hausa-Fulani (Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto) 
for Alhaji Shehu Shagari (Fulani) whose party was the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Rivers state, with a 
large Igbo population, was counted as part of the NPP base; Kwara, with a large Yoruba population, was seen as 
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part of the UPN stronghold; and Niger, with its historical close links and ties to the Fulani Empire in the North, 
was presumed to be part of the NPN base. But the results of the elections showed a different orientation. For 
instance, the UPN and the NPP seats won in Kwara and in Rivers respectively, were mainly in the Yoruba and 
Igbo constituencies.  
It was to become obvious that the results of the presidential elections in 1979 did not satisfy the various 
presidential candidates, especially the Yoruba-based UPN of Obafemi Awolowo. He undertook a series of legal 
battles to ensure that he prevented Alhaji Shehu Shagari (NPN) from being sworn-in as President of the Second 
Republic, because according to him, he did not win the necessary 2/3 majority in all the states to become the 
President of Nigeria. The fierce post-election legal battles certainly re-enacted the situation in the First Republic 
of Nigeria. The only difference was that the political set-up in the Second Republic was more trans-ethnic than in 
the former. The effort to overcome complete regionalism and ethnicism was manifested in the political alliances 
between the nine U.P.N., G.N.P.P., and P.R.P. Governors who explained their collaborations as being rooted in 
their common social and political orientations. The NPN, on the other hand, struggled to stand up to oppositions 
through the establishment of Presidential liaison offices in all the 19 states – an action interpreted by the allied 
Governors as a breach of the policy to enhance cordial and effective cooperation between the Federal 
Government and the State Governments, irrespective of the party in control. The same sort of problem was 
witnessed in the conflict over Revenue Allocation whereby the NPN-controlled Federal Government used the 
excessive Revenue Allocation power accorded the Presidency to humiliate most differing state Governments on 
party basis.  
A substantial allocation of revenue was also made at this time for the promotion of Islam, especially in the North. A clear 
indication is shown in the unbridled spending of Ministers, political officials, and party financiers. No wonder, Nigeria 
relapsed economically in the Second Republic and declared Austerity Measures in 1981, two years after the inauguration of 
the Second Republic. It was the era of the Petro-Naira and fragrant expenses. The Petro-Naira was an expression used to 
describe the era of the oil boom in Nigeria when there was a lot of money accruing from the sale of crude oil in the 
international market. It was also associated with the reckless spending habit of Nigerian politicians during the same point in 
history. The following analysis from Tribune Newspaper speaks for itself: 13 members of the NPN donated a total of 5 
million Naira to party political funds in a one-hour ceremony. A Nigerian citizen left 500,000 pounds in a London Taxi, while 
another gave 3 million to an English woman. Dr. Olusola Saraki (NPN) donated a total of 695,000 Naira to various charitable 
institutions in his constituency, Ilorin, having accepted 50,000 Naira bribe from Leyland Motors. Richard Akinjide (NPN), 
Attorney General, Minister of Justice, took a 120,000 Naira bribe from Jamal Engineering Company under the First 
Republic, and stayed 18 months in Ikoyi Hotel at the expense of the Government, running up a bill of 113,234 Naira, even 
though he was also provided with official quarters(West Africa, July 6, 1981, pp.1518-1525; New Nigerian (Kaduna), July 8, 
1981; New Nigerian, July 5, 1981; Daily Sketch (Ibadan), June 28, 1981; Daily Sketch, July 8; 1981). Two Senators awarded 
a contract for a new aircraft to a British firm and asked that the Nigerian Governments’ bill should include an additional 9 
million Naira to be split between the senators and the middlemen who arranged the deal. Governor Ibrahim of Niger State 
was found to be carrying 3 million Naira on him when he visited London ( Barber, and Karim, 1982, pp.437-438). There 
could have been some exaggerations in the reports of Money politics in the second Republic, but the reality remains that a lot 
of religious politics and ethnic rivalries were enhanced by the reckless flow of the Naira. It is pertinent to know that at the 
time of these incidents of political plundering of the national economy, 5 Million Naira was equivalent to $8 Million. Today, 
the reverse is hundred-fold the case: $1 Million = circa 135 Million Naira. The Second Republic directed by the Northern- 
Muslim dominated NPN also witnessed the mysterious disappearance of 2.8 Billion Naira from the Nigerian Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC). Till date, the incident has not been explained. In May 1981, about thirteen NPN stalwarts raised a 
whooping sum of 5 Million Naira at the dedication of a new NPN National Secretariat.  
Reckless spending, money laundry, and inter-party conflicts were not the only signs of derailment from the ideals set up by 
the political parties of the Second Republic. Intra-party squabbles and legal battles also constituted a spanner in the wheel of 
progress of the nation. The PRP split in the national executive and administration did not only diminish its ideals but also led 
to its final decay and demise. To worsen matters for the Party, there was the long misunderstanding in the Kaduna executive 
and legislature, which eventually led to the impeachment of the Governor, Alhaji Balarabe Musa on June 22, 1981. In Kano, 
the radical Governor, Abubakar Rimi, quarrelled intensely with the traditional and religious ruler/Emir of Kano. When the 
former threatened punitive measures against the Emir of Kano for alleged acts of disrespect to the PRP state Government, the 
Kano branch of NPN incited the people to protect the dignity of the office of the Emir (New Nigerian, July 10, 1981). The 
consequences of the mass reaction against the threat of the state government led to a wanton destruction of lives and property 
worth over 100 Million Naira. It was in the wake of the random or organised vandalism as Abubakar Rimi was in Maiduguri 
for a meeting of the nine Progressive Governors that his chief political adviser, Dr. Bala Mohammed was killed (Rufai 
Ibrahim, 1981, pp.73-74). Other things destroyed in the July 10, 1981 inferno in Kano included the State Government 
Secretariat which housed five strategic Ministries, including Fianance, the Radio House Kano, the State house of Assembly, 
the headquarters of the pro-Imoudu PRP ( After the split in the PRP, Chief Michael Imoudu became the national chairman of 
his own faction of the PRP with Governor Abubakar Rimi of Kano State as secretary, while the original PRP retained Alhaji 
Aminu Kano and S.G. Ikoku as national President and National Secretary, respectively), the site of the State’s new publishing 
company, and the residential places of the Kano state officials (New Nigerian, July 11, 1981; West Africa, July 20, 1981, 
p.1635).  
 
3. General Ibrahim Babangida and the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
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The dissatisfaction with Shagari and his administration led to a military coup on 31 December 1983. The two 
following military rulers, Muhammadu Buhari (1January 1984- 27 August 1985) and Ibrahim Babangida 
(27August 1985- 27August 1993), both northerners and Muslims, did not succeed in changing this situation in 
spite of their vigorous efforts to bend towards Muslim interests. Babangida’s administration was characterised by 
a political transitional programme, which opened up religious issues of serious concern. It was strictly speaking 
in the spirit of the Islamic tajdid or reformation, which started after the independence of Nigeria in 1960. The 
thirst to keep religion and politics in the same bandwagon increased everyday in the Islamic circle. Although the 
constitution defined that “the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as a state 
religion”, there was every indication that the Muslim section of the polity was not yet satisfied with the level of 
Islamic involvement in the life of the generality of the people. 
But General Ibrahim Babangida (rtd) initiated the most remarkable strain in the relationship between Muslims and Christians 
in the post-independent era, with the secret inclusion of Nigeria into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (O.I.C). The 
chaos inflicted on the Nation as a result of this action cannot be underestimated. A lot of religious riots were witnessed, 
especially in the North between Christians and Muslims. At no time did one observe Christians reacting as vehemently as 
during this time. Lectures, Seminars, and even books were written to call the government to order. Although the membership 
was reduced to an observer-status, the majority of the Christian population did not believe the honesty of the military 
dictatorship of Babangida. Another programme that proved the determination to impose the Sharia on the polity was the 
Decree, No. 26 by the Babangida Administration on 25 November 1986, under the platform of Constitutional Amendments 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria: Official Gazett, November, 1986, vol. 73, no.59, p.311). The word “personal” (that is, limiting 
the application of the Sharia to the sphere of family law and practice) was deleted wherever it occurred after the word 
“Islamic” (which extended the scope of the application of the Sharia with its concomittant consequences) in the Constitution, 
especially in sections 217, 223(1), 226 (a), 241(3) and 242, which were meant to give the Sharia a very wide range of civil 
application, creating the avenue for its possible ‘universalisation’ (that is, the possible prosecution of non-Muslims according 
to Islamic law) in the context of the Nigeria legal code. 
When Ibrahim Babangida assumed office, his emphasis on the secular nature of the constitution and its application seemed to 
allay the fears of Islamic imposition on the other members of the society (New Nigerian, Kaduna, 6 October 1989). But it was 
not to last for a long time. A series of examples could contradict Babangida’s reiteration of secularity in 1989 and what his 
government did from 1985 when he took office. They include: his political appointments, Nigeria’s membership in the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference, the 1987 Kafanchan crisis, and the attempted coup of Gideon Orkah on 22 April 1990. 
Summarising the Islamisation strategies of his administration, J. Kenny states “Ibrahim Babangida brought more strain by 
secretly carrying the nation into the OIC. There were several serious religious riots in the North between 1987 and 1992. 
Babangida’s cancellation of the June 12, 1993 presidential election might have plunged the country into a bitter religious war, 
but for the fact that the elected candidate was a Muslim. There was much northern Muslim complaining of marginalisation 
when Obasanjo came in 1999” ( Kenny, 2000,  p. 112). 
When Babangida took over power from Buhari, Christians thought that the man (Buhari) who had an avowed intention to 
institute Islam in Nigeria had gone (Newswatch, Lagos, 24 February, 1986.). The composition of the Supreme Military 
Council (SMC) under Muhammadu Buhari might have informed this fear. Under him, there were 10 Muslims out of 19 
members in the SMC. 9 members were Christians. In the council of Ministers with 21 members, eleven were Muslims while 
10 were Christians. In the National Council of States, comprising the 19 military governors of the nineteen states, there were 
seven Muslims and twelve Christians. But it was clear that more important decisions were taken in the first and second 
councils because of their federal nature. The first two years of Babangida’s regime tilted towards a greater Christian 
representation in the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). But it was not to last for a long time. There were 14 Muslims 
and 14 Christians in the AFRC. In the national council of ministers, 13 members were Christians while 9 members were 
Muslims. Out of the 19 military governors in the national Council of States, 14 were Christians while 5 were Muslims. With 
204 Christian members in the three arms of government and only 138 Muslims between 1985 and 1989 in the three arms of 
government, the impression was created that Christians were the favoured ones (The Democrat, Kaduna, 28 May  1990.).  
The secret admission of Nigeria into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in January 1986 was the first shock 
received from the Babangida regime, although he had more Christians than Muslims in the three arms of government. It was 
a French news service based in Lagos, which announced that Nigeria had been formally admitted into the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference. When the news was eventually confirmed, Nigerians became aware of the OIC for the first time, as well 
as of the aims of it. Set up by Muslim countries for the progress of Islam, “it claimed to offer assistance to member countries” 
(Makozi, 1996, p.58), although “it was clear that in the end, the organisation was nothing other than a Trojan horse for 
Islamic evangelism” (Makozi, op.cit., p.58.).  It is an event that remains active in the minds of all Nigerian Christians. The 
removal of Ebitu Ukiwe (a Christian and his second in command) because he told the Press that the issue was neither 
discussed in the AFRC nor in the Council of Ministers was not a happy event for the majority of Christians and Nigerians 
alike (Guardian, Lagos, 24 January, 1986). The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) reacted strongly against the removal, 
accusing the government of a plan to islamise the country through the entrance into the OIC, although to no effect 
(Newswatch, Lagos, 24 February 1986; Anthony Okogie, in Independent, Sunday 26 May, 1991, p.1). CAN condemned the 
entrance of Nigeria into the OIC as clandestine and demanded a total and unconditional withdrawal. In defence of Islam, the 
Muslims “argued that this was a mere concession to Muslims and that since Nigeria had already established diplomatic 
relations with the Vatican, there was really no contradiction in Nigeria’s membership of the organisation. The government 
finally claimed to have resolved the matter by setting up an amorphous group which it called the Advisory Council on 
Religious Affairs (ACRA)” (Makozi, op.cit., p.59). The task of the group was not to be easy. Thus, although the group was 
made up of an equal number of Christians and Muslims, there was a clear sign of distrust among the members who finally 
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presented a report, which showed that no side had made any concessions. The aftermath of the growing tension and distrust 
was given expression in the series of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in 1987, as seen in the Kafanchan crisis 
of 5-12   March 1987 in which a lot of lives and property were lost in a religious imbroglio between Christians and Muslims 
(Communiqué of the Council of ‘Ulama’ on the Occasion of the Kafanchan Riots in March 1987). Another factor of the OIC 
crisis in Nigeria is important to note.  To counteract the Christian opposition to the OIC, the Muslim Council of Nigeria 
issued a statement that tended towards a tough pursuit of Muslim rights and privileges in Nigeria (Afkar Inquiry, May 1986). 
I will devote more detailed explanation of the Kafanchan crisis in the next Chapter as an obstacle to dialogue as well as 
mutual co-existence between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. It is true that some African countries with large Christian 
population (Uganda, Sierra Leone, Benin republic, Gabon, etc) are in the OIC, yet the situation in Nigeria must be considered 
on its own merit. But a word to the Muslim description of the Justice Karibi Whyte (a Christian) Tribunal authorised to 
investigate the bloody clash and apportion appropriate blame showed the extent of the distrust that had developed between 
Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The Islamic Welfare Foundation in Lagos characterised Karibi Whyte’s judgement as a 
‘kangaroo justice’ because of undue long years of prison sentence given to Muslim culprits (Islamic Welfare Foundation, 
Lagos, 1989; Council of Ulama Press Conference, Kano, 31 May 1990).  
In the characteristic uncertainty of Ibrahim Babangida’s tenure, he also removed Lt. General Domkat Bali (a Christian, 
defense minister, member of the AFRC and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) in December 1989. Although he assumed 
the post of defence minister himself after the removal of Bali, he gave it up after a short time. He also reduced the 
membership of the Council of Ministers to 19, with 10 Muslims and 9 Christians (New Nigerian, Kaduna, 3 January, 1990). 
The other two arms of government were also affected in favour of Muslims. It became clear in which direction Babangida 
was heading. There was an immediate response from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which saw in the reshuffles 
a movement towards a fulfilment of some Islamic demands. A letter followed demonstrations in the north to General Ibrahim 
Babangida, which made it clear to him that his actions were geared towards the Islamisation of Nigeria (Protest Letter to 
General Ibrahim Babangida, 1989. The Letter was also widely circulated among Christians).  To allay fears of maltreatment 
under his administration, Babangida replied at the occasion of the swearing-in of a new internal minister in 1989 that the 
entity called Nigeria does not admit of the alleged North-South or Christian-Muslim dichotomy as alleged by CAN. The 
unfolding events of his administration would prove his statement right or wrong. 
If the regime of Sani Abacha (the successor of Babangida) was known for direct and ruthless brutality, that of Babangida 
could be described as one that incited a lot of manipulative religious politics and disharmony. Infact, it could be said that it 
was Babangida’s regime that started an elaborate process of the disorganisation of harmonious living in Nigeria after the 
Second Republic. Many historians describe the coup organised by Major Gideon Orkah (Benue State) on 22 April 1990 as an 
articulation of the sentiments of Christians in the unruly governance of Ibrahim Babangida. It was described as a re-
enactment of the dissatisfaction of the Middle belt Christians with the Northern hegemony during and after the colonial rule. 
The post-coup announcement (Post-coup broadcast of Major Gideon Orkar, April 22, 1990; Newswatch, 7 May 1990) 
whereby Muslim states of Sokoto, Katsina, Borno, Kano, and Bauchi were cut off from the Federation of Nigeria cannot be 
explained without some reference to religious sentiments and affiliations. Who knows what could have happened if the Orkah 
coup of 1990 had succeeded, in what the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) described as a “coup against the Muslim-
dominated north” by the Christian Middle Belt (BBC news bulletin, 22 April 1990)? To add credence to the BBC report, the 
coordinator of the Northern Zone of CAN, Jolly Tanko Yusuf was arrested and held in connection with the foiled coup. The 
secretary of the northern branch of CAN was also arrested, questioned, and detained. CAN made her protests against the 
arrests and detention of her executive members, and pressed on the government to withdraw from the OIC. Moreover, they 
demanded the immediate dismissal of two controversial Muslim ministers – Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman, in-charge of external 
affairs, and Professor Jibril Aminu, holding the portfolio of Petroleum Resources – since they represented an overt fulfilment 
of the conditions of the membership of any country in the OIC (Archbishop Okogie, Statement by CAN President in 
Democrat, Kaduna, 28 May 1990). The Council of Ulama answered to the protest of CAN, thus: “We wish to state 
categorically that the assumption by CAN that the present government is an Islamic one is untrue. Strictly speaking, the 
government has more to do with Christianity than Islam since secularism as practised by the government is an extension of 
the Church concept of government. In Islam, politics and religion are inseparable. For a government to be Islamic, Allah has 
to be the legislator through the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet” (Press conference by Council of Ulama, Kano, 31May 
1990; see also Press Conference by The National Council of Muslim Youth Organisations (NACOMYO), Lagos, June 1990). 
The coup was muted to have been sponsored by a wealthy young Christian businessman from the South. The 36 year-old 
Great Ogboru was described as a ‘born-again’ Christian of the Pentecostal Household of God Fellowship Church, Ikeja, and 
Lagos. His whereabouts have been unknown since the foiled coup. 
 
4. Babangida’s Transition to Civil Rule Agenda and Religious Politics 
 
Few months after the military coup of Ibrahim Babangida and his assumption of power, he set up a Transition to Civil Rule 
Committee in 1986. The Federal Military Government charged the Committee with the task of collating information about 
the kind of political future that would suit Nigerians. To facilitate the political process, the Government confirmed its 
acceptance of the recommendation of the Panel for the adoption of a two party political system. But the step was soon to be 
exposed to suspicion. This is because “the narrowing down of political choice to two parties in an environment already 
poisoned by so much religious suspicion only paved the way for the emergence of religion as a basis for political 
competition” (Makozi, op.cit., p.60). There was no other cogent reason for this kind of argument considering the annulment 
of twenty associations vying for recognition as political parties by a government that claimed to be open to return to civil 
rule. The two parties formed by the government were called the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). Both represented the traditional inclination to the right and to the left respectively. There was 
nothing democratic or civil in the mode of their establishment. This is because the government “drew up Manifestoes for both 
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parties and built political party structures for them in all the State and Local Government Headquarters of the States. 
Nigerians were then ordered to join the parties which Jack had built” (Makozi, op.cit., p.61). Nothing was really defined in 
Babangida’s political agenda for Nigeria, such that by 1991 election dates and programmes had been twisted several times. In 
what seemed a glimpse of hope for the already embattled populace, elections into the State and National Assemblies, as well 
as Gubernatorial elections were held. In the final leg of the elections, Alhaji Tofa (NRC) and Chief M.K.O. Abiola (SDP) 
were allowed to contest on the Presidential platform for their different parties. Both were Muslims – from the core North and 
the South respectively. Although the electorate knew their connections with the military and open support for the Islamisation 
programme in Nigeria, the latter preferred them to the everlasting manipulations of Ibrahim Babangida. Perhaps the 
annulment of the 12 June, 1993 elections of which Abiola was emerging, as winner was an indication that the Northern 
Oligarchy was not completely assured of the success of the Islamisation programme under Abiola. But this annulment was to 
open the Pandora box of other hidden agendas in Nigeria. It is important to note that the NRC had a larger followership in the 
Muslim North than in the Christian South, and vice versa. 
 
5. The Fatwa Commission of 1990 
 
The Sharia is, therefore, considered in some quarters as an effort that has degenerated into an outright use of violence and 
fundamentalist manoeuvres, often in conflict with the modern and contemporary principles of democracy, freedom of 
worship and mutual co-existence. The historical background is clear. Although the western systems conferred political 
prominence on the likes of the Sardauna of Sokoto, they created the added problem of spiritual legitimacy. He must have to 
combine both effectively in order to prove his credibility to other Muslims since the indubitable expectation of every Muslim 
is to have the Sharia take precedence “over all other legal systems in Nigeria as the law that governs the majority of her 
people” (Suleiman, Political Bureau, Lagos, 1986; New Nigerian, Kaduna, September 1986; National Concord, Lagos, 6 
April 1988). It is this tradition that the Northern hegemony has tried to uphold irrespective of the side effects to the 
democratic process in Nigeria. The final process of the implementation of the Sharia, especially in the North could be traced 
to the Fatwa (authoritative ruling and problem-solving) Commission established in May 1990 by the Centre for Islamic Legal 
studies at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.  The scope of the commission’s work was not only religious, but also political 
and economical. The enforcement of the Sharia in Zamfara by the governor points to a fulfilment or realisation of that dream. 
For instance, laws prohibiting prostitution, alcohol, and gambling, which are regarded as Christian and secular are put in 
place. They are also seen as economically Islamic and puritanistic. The Zakat (poor tax), which is central in Islam as way of 
redistributing wealth between the rich and the poor, are enforced. Land reforms, which involve giving the majority of the land 
to peasants, are also expected to be put in place. Whether the Muslims will be able to take over land already acquired by the 
Multinational companies – sometimes regarded as Christian and from Europe and America – is not yet clear. Based on the 
riba or collection of interest, the Muslims are discouraging loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  
 
6.  The era of Muhammadu Sani Abacha and General Abdulkarim Abubakar (1993-1999) 
 
With the annulment of the democratic elections on 23 June 1993 in which Alhaji Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba 
from the South, won, another trend of religious antagonism blew open. It is not surprising that such a situation 
would arise after the suspicions surrounding the 1990 Christian-led coup d’état. The transition to civil rule 
scheduled for 1992 with two political parties aimed at de-emphasising regional politics was further postponed. 
Most scholars claim that Abiola, whose prospects of winning the election under the auspices of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) against the favourite of the incumbent, Ibrahim Babangida, was seen in the North as an 
unconvincing Muslim who could not carry out the programme of Islamising Nigeria. Owing to the uncertainty of 
his possible allegiance to the true spirit of the Muslim Northern Oligarchy in the promotion of Islam, he was 
imprisoned until he died in 1998 under inexplicable circumstances. The rage of the Yorubas due to the denial of 
a political mandate they considered theirs at that time was sharper than expected. To avert anarchy, Ibrahim 
Babangida installed an Interim National Government (ING), which was headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan – a 
Yoruba multi-national and business tycoon – from the same constituency as Chief M.K.O Abiola himself. The 
interim President who managed the country only a few months until General Sani Abacha – the most senior 
military officer in Babangida’s era  - took over in November 1993, was a Christian. Sani Abacha’s five years of 
dictatorship (1993-1998) did not help issues as well. In fact, he is described as the worst military dictator Nigeria 
ever had. He did not only pursue the cause of Islamisation of Nigeria, he emptied the foreign reserves of the 
country. He is accused of siphoning more than $5 billion into different foreign accounts. Until today, only about 
$708 million have been recovered Swiss banks. His death in 1998, which was greeted by street parties and 
jubilations, saw to the ascendancy of General Abdusalami Abubakar – also a Muslim - who after one year 
handed power over to a democratically elected president, Olusegun Obasanjo. Six months after his assumption of 
office, most Northern states began to adopt the Sharia as State law. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
news of Thursday, 5 July 2001, paints the picture thus: “after lurching from one Military Coup to another, 
Nigeria now has an elected leadership. But it faces the growing challenge of preventing Africa’s most populous 
country from breaking apart along ethnic and religious lines. Political liberalisation ushered in by the return to 
civilian rule in 1999 has allowed militants from religious and ethnic groups to express their frustrations more 
freely, and with increasing violence... The imposition of Islamic law in several states has embedded divisions 
and caused thousands of Christians to flee”. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.5, No.12, 2015 
 
71 
If General Abdulsalami Abubakar (rtd) (1998-1999) had continued a long time in office, he could have without doubt 
continued the programme of the Sharia without fears or favours. This could be attested to, by the radical change he effected 
in the 1999 Constitution, which gave the Sharia the new impetus it is enjoying presently in the Constitution of Nigeria. 
According to David Iheanacho, “Nigeria was better of a secular state of the 1979 Constitution than a multi-religious state of 
1999 Constitution. Granted that the word “secular” sounds jeering and too foreign and perhaps too American for the 
religiously and culturally sensitive Nigerians, it gave the Nigerian state the necessary freedom and independence to deal with 
religious issues in a hands-off manner” (Iheanacho, and David,  in http://nigeriaworld.com, Saturday, 23 February 2002, p.7).   
 
7. Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2003) and the resurgence of the Sharia 
 
Having gone the lane of historical development among the military juntas and few democratic experiments in Nigeria since 
independence, it is clear that ‘The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission’ (HRVIC) set up by Olusegun 
Obasanjo immediately after the institution of the third republic on 29 May 1999 cannot but be lauded as a noble step in the 
right direction of national reconciliation and possible reparation of individual and communal wrongs against one another 
since 1960. Making the findings of the commission public, the chairman of the commission, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa 
(retired justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria) said: “We wounded one another in communal clashes and religious riots. We 
are all therefore equally guilty. While the powers-that-be have to apologise to Nigerians, we the citizenry have also to 
apologise to one another. This will be the first step in the right healing process of reconciliation” (Daily Champion, Lagos, 
May 30, 2002). The wisdom underlying this judgement was also based on the fact that the Commission found that “from its 
inquiries, (it) discovered that during the period under review (15 January 1966 to 28 May 1999), the greatest offenders and 
gross violators of human rights of fellow Nigerians were the military dictatorships and their overzealous security outfits” 
(Daily champion, Lagos, May 30, 2002). Although the indictment of the military was coated in philosophical terms, the 
historical development of the military and politics in Nigeria, especially in relation to the manipulation of religion, shows that 
the present strain in the relation between Muslims and Christians constitutes one of the injuries suffered by the polity. A clear 
sign of the Muslim determination to impose Islam on the Nigeria polity is remarkable with the imposition of the Sharia in 
most of the Northern States of the Federation in opposition to the election of a Christian President -Olusegun Obasanjo - for 
Nigeria. One cannot immediately say with certainty to what extent the Sharia would succeed in disintegrating or uniting 
Nigeria. One fact is clear: either Muslims accept the civil structure of Nigeria and live at peace with the others or they 
continue to inflict untold inquietude on the generality of the populace until a complete rupture occurs in what is today called 
Nigeria. 
 
8. President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and the Boko Haram 
 
It was assumed towards the end of Obasanjo’s regime (1999-2007) that Nigeria would breed a little and fresh air 
of relief from different kinds of agitiations and religious cum ethnic manipulations. Thus, the election of Alhaji 
Musa Yar’dua after Obasanjo was heralded with joy. He was considered a moderate who could effect measures 
that would appease the Niger Delta Militants who were fighting for equity in the distribution of the Oil proceeds 
from their region. But little did anyone know that his death would re-ignite more complicated agitations from 
Northern Nigeria propagated under the umbrella of some religious radicals called Boko Haram. Since July 2009, 
Boko Haram has been the scourge that has eaten deep into the unity of Nigeria as a nation. Boko Haram started 
the onslaught as a religious crusader-group for the purification of the Nigerian system. But with time, it 
manifested itself as a marauding religious group, killing and aiming people; stealing and robbing banks to 
finance their nefarious activities; burning houses and public institutions; sending people into exile and cutting 
telecommunication networks to prevent the military from reaching their hideout.  
The general elections of 2015 have been distorted through the activities of Boko Haram. It is postulated that 
more half a million people have been displaced all over Nigeria.     
 
9. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Before the official departure of the colonial administration in 1960, there was a lot of advancement brought 
through education, science and technology. But there was also a huge arrears of problems left on the people’s 
shoulders. The most significant of them was the religious intrigue and conflict between Muslims and Christians. 
It was an ugly situation that was transferred into the political arena. Thus, after the political independence of 
Nigeria in 1960, Muslim and Christian leaders sought to project their various beliefs through various means. 
Perhaps, the urge to re-assert the Status quo ante by Muslims in the governance of the country was most 
pronounced than ever. From their reduced status of indirect leadership during colonialism, they wanted a central 
position of governance. But it was bound to create problems, which before long degenerated into a civil war 
from 1967 to 1970. The prize was enormous for the nascent democracy in Nigeria. Since the end of that war, 
Nigeria has experienced an intensified war of religious antagonism and misunderstanding. Today, Boko Haram 
has taken the centre-stage. The North wants the political power badly in order to continue their over-lordship of 
the other parts of Nigeria. However, the development in the country shows that the country would be better 
governed if mutual understanding, justice, tolerance, fair-play, and patriotism should be given a pride of place. 
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